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From Estes to Chandler: The
Distinction Between Television
and Newspaper Trial Coverage
By DAVID TAJGMAN*
I. Introduction
First Amendment guarantees of press' access to criminal trial
proceedings have never been absolute. The United States Supreme
Court has ruled that the right of the press to view proceedings
should not interfere with the right of the accused to a fair trial.' A
balancing test between the rights of a free-press and those of an
accused has, ostensibly, guided courts in deciding matters of press
access to the courtroom. As set forth in Craig v. Harney,
The history of the power to punish for contempt and the un-
equivocal command of the First Amendment serve as constant re-
minders that freedom of speech and of the press should not be
impaired through the exercise of that power, unless there is no
doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice.8
As a general proposition, therefore, press access to criminal pro-
ceedings, be it newspaper or television, may be restricted when it
can be shown that coverage will threaten the fairness of the trial.'
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. Unless otherwise indicated in this note, the word "press" refers to the newsgathering
and dissemination aspects of "television" (including photographic and electronic motion
picture technology) and "newspapers" (including magazines, tabloids, and other print me-
dium processes). Although this definition may be overbroad or inaccurate for mass media
purists, it is the least confusing definition available considering that the modern American
"press" may not be construed to exclude the broadcast media of radio and television. The
terms "television" and "newspaper" are those used most often in describing the types of
press coverage attending criminal trial proceedings.
2. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542 (1964); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980).
3. 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947), emphasis added.
4. This analysis shall henceforth be referred to as the "traditional free-press/fair-trial
analysis". See, The Relationship Between the Constitutional Right of a Free Press and the
Constitutional Guarantees of an Impartial Trial: Hearings on S. 290 Before the Subcomm.
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That principle was clearly established by the United States Su-
preme Court when it decided Chandler v. Florida' and clarified
the holding of Estes v. Texas.'
The 1965 Estes decision was widely7 interpreted as establishing
a per se rule that television coverage of criminal trial proceedings
was an inherent threat to due process.8 The Court's decision in
Chandler limited Estes to the facts of the case' even though four
Justices in Estes10 explicitly espoused a per se rule," finding tele-
on Constitutional Rights and the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), hereinafter cited as Free
Press and Impartial Trial Hearings.
5. 449 U.S. 560 (1981). In Chandler, two Miami Beach police officers were tried for bur-
glarizing a popular local resturant. The crucial testimony of an insomniac amateur "ham"
radio operator who had inadvertantly intercepted the burglars' walkie-talkie conversations
on the night of the break-in caught the interest of a local television station. Under Florida's
then-existing experimental one year program, cameras were allowed in the courtroom during
the trial over the defendant's objection that the cameras' presence would prejudice his
rights. Both the trial court and Florida's Supreme Court found defense objections uncon-
vincing. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that a camera's presence in
the criminal trial courtroom is not a per se violation of the accused's fair trial rights. A
showing of actual prejudice caused by the cameras' presence would be needed to find a
violation of constitutional rights.
6. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). In Estes, Texas financier Billy Sol Estes was indicted and tried for
swindling. Massive pretrial publicity gave the trial national notoriety. Estes' counsel made a
pretrial motion to prevent telecasting, radio broadcasting, or photographing of the trial. The
pretrial motion hearings were covered by electronic and photographic cameramen as well as
radio. The hearings emphasized the notorious nature of the trial and the prejudicial impact
cameras in the courtroom would have. Although the profusion of cameramen and equipment
in the courtroom caused considerable disruption, the trial court denied the motion, but
granted a one month continuance of the trial. When trial resumed, the television cameras,
equipment, and technicians were restricted to a booth in the rear of the courtroom. After
Estes' conviction, appeal was taken claiming that televising and broadcasting the trial vio-
lated appellant's due process rights. Although the trial court and appellate court rejected
defense contentions, the United States Supreme Court held that televising courtroom pro-
ceedings over defendant's objections, where there was widespread public interest in the trial,
inherently infringed on defendant's due process rights.
7. See Casenote, Estes v. Texas, 34 FORDHAM L.REv. 329, 333 (1965); Casenote, Television
in the Courtroom: Estes v. Texas, 6 SANTA CLARA LAW. 109, 110 (1965); Casenote, Estes v.
Texas, 111 N.Y.L.F. 533, (1965); Casenote, Estes v. Texas, 37 Miss. L.J. 168 (1965). But cf.,
Casenote, Estes v. Texas, 38 U. CoLo. L. REV. 276, 279 (1966), where the author warned that
Estes should not be read as establishing a per se rule. Also, Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S.
794, 799 (1974).
8. "[Alt times a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that
prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process. . . . In this case it
is . . . [clear] . . . that such a rule must be applied." 381 U.S. at 542-544.
9. "[W]e conclude that Estes is not to be read as announcing a constitutional rule barring
still photographic, radio and television coverage in all cases and under all circumstances."
449 U.S. at 573.
10. Justices Warren, Clark, Douglas, and Goldberg.
11. While reading the individual opinions in Estes as not establishing, in totality, a per se
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vision cameras "inherently suspect"12 as prejudicing the rights of
the accused. These Justices advocated banning cameras from crim-
inal trials. Justice Harlan's fifth concurring opinion seemed to re-
ject such a holding-giving the Chandler Court a basis for finding
that Estes had not actually created a per se rule.13
The Chandler Court found that the Constitution does not pro-
hibit a state from allowing experimental programs which permit
camera access to criminal trial proceedings over a defendant's ob-
jection." "Absent a showing of prejudice of constitutional dimen-
sions to these defendants," the Court found no grounds for over-
turning a trial court verdict solely because of the presence of a
photographic" or electronic camera. Thus, by finding that Estes
had not created a per se rule and by distinguishing the facts in
Chandler,7 the Court's decision clarified the standard for limiting
newspaper and television access to criminal trial proceedings.
Despite the Chandler Court's attempt to distinguish that case
from Estes, this writer agrees with Justices Stewart and White, the
two remaining Estes Justices participating in Chandler, who said
that Chandler made a "square departure from precedent." 8 Chan-
dler "effectively eviscerates Estes" 9 without sufficiently address-
ing the aspects of television coverage found most objectionable in
rule, six of eight Justices participating in Chandler found "some support" for a per se inter-
pretation of the decision. 449 U.S. at 570. Burger, C.J., delivered the Opinion of the Court,
in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., took
no part in the decision of the case. Justices White and Stewart were the only members of
the Chandler Court who participated in the Estes decision. Their concurring opinions dif-
fered with the Court's opinion in that they specifically overturned Estes, finding that the
earlier case had established a per se rule against cameras in the courtroom. In Estes, Justice
Stewart, joined by Justices Black, Brennan and White, wrote a dissenting opinion, asserting
that although constitutional risks were involved in introducing television into the court-
room, the Court should not elevate those risks to a per se rule banning cameras in the
courtroom, as the majority had. 381 U.S. at 601. The Estes majority was comprised of Jus-
tice Clark delivering the Opinion of the Court, joined by Warren, C.J., Douglas and
Goldberg, JJ. in a concurring opinion, and Harlan, J. in a third concurring opinion.
12. 381 U.S. at 544.
13. Chief Justice Burger noted the apparent per se rule adopted in the opinion of the
Estes Court and Justice Warren's concurring opinion, and the explicit rejection of the per se
rule by the minority, saying in Chandler: "A careful analysis of Justice Harlan's [swing
vote] opinion is therefore fundamental to an understanding of the ultimate holding of Es-
tes." 449 U.S. at 571.
14. 449 U.S. at 583.
15. 449 U.S. at 582.
16. Either still or motion picture photographic cameras.
17. See text accompanying notes 47-49, infra.
18. 449 U.S. at 586.
19. Id. at 588 (White, J., concurring).
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Estes.
The traditional balancing test between the right of the press to
cover criminal proceedings and the right of the accused to a fair
trial does not sufficiently explain the outcomes in Estes and Chan-
dler. At least four members of the Court in Estes clearly stretched
the test by presuming that the presence of cameras prejudiced the
rights of the accused. These members of the Court assumedo there
was great danger in allowing cameras in the courtroom. In Chan-
dler the Court did not presume prejudice but asked for proof that
the presence of cameras either impaired the jurors' ability to fairly
decide the case or adversely influenced the behavior of trial par-
ticipants.21 Unable to make a showing of either, defendant-appel-
lants failed to establish prejudice of constitutional dimension."
Why were four members of the Court in Estes unwilling to fol-
low strictly the traditional free-press/fair-trial analysis-which
makes necessary a showing of probable prejudice before finding a
due process violation 2"-for television coverage? And why has
Chandler made the single standard again applicable to both news-
20. See 381 U.S. at 550 and 583 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See also, 449 U.S. at 584
(Stewart, J., concurring). Cf. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976),
where a showing of clear and present danger of press-caused prejudice was determined to, be
required before the trial judge can impose prior restraint on the press; Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1965), where a murder conviction was overturned because press coverage of
the trial process violated the defendant's due process rights by turning the trial into a " 'Ro-
man holiday' for the news media"; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) where the United
States Supreme Court struck down a state conviction on grounds of press related prejudice
resulting in almost 90% of the prospective jurors entertaining some opinion as to defen-
dant's guilt, as established by voir dire. Each of these cases presented evidence of specific
prejudicial impact.
21. See 449 U.S. at 575.
22. To say that the appellants have not demonstrated that broadcast coverage is
inherently a denial of due process is not to say that the appellants were in fact
accorded all of the protections of due process in their trial. As noted earlier, a
defendant has the right on review to show that the media's coverage of his
case-printed or broadcast-compromised the ability of the jury to judge him
fairly. Alternatively, a defendant might show that broadcast coverage of his par-
ticular case had an adverse impact on the trial participants sufficient to constitute
a denial of due process. Neither showing was made in this case. Id. at 581.
23. The Court has found other instances in which a showing of actual prejudice was not a
prerequisite for reversal. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 542. The Court states that Estes was
similar to Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) and Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466
(1965). "In each of these cases the Court departed from the approach it charted in Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), and in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), where [they]
made a careful examination of the facts in order to determine whether prejudice resulted. In
Rideau and Turner the Court did not stop to consider the actual effect of the practice but
struck down the conviction on the ground that prejudice was inherent in it." 381 U.S. at
543, emphasis in original. See, Casenote, Estes v. Texas, 30 ALB. L. REV. 158, 161 (1966).
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paper and television coverage?
Although both Courts were clearly aware of the different "func-
tion and effect""' of newspaper and television coverage, these dis-
tinctions were not perceived in the same manner. This note con-
tends that the Court in Estes weighed what it perceived to be the
beneficial and detrimental powers of cameras in the courtroom
against objectives of the First and Sixth Amendments" which are
traditionally oriented toward newspaper coverage of trials. The
Court found these objectives ill-served by the electronic arm of the
modern press. Rather than require a showing of prejudicial impact,
the Court presumed prejudice, rejecting a single standard for de-
termining when either newspaper or television coverage can be re-
stricted. Hence, the Estes Court created what appeared to be a dis-
tinction" between newspaper and television coverage rights.27
The same weighing occurred in Chandler. In that case, however,
the Court perceived the beneficial and detrimental powers of tele-
vision coverage differently. As a result, it was unwilling to presume
the prejudice found by the members of the Estes Court to be "in-
herent" in television coverage of a trial. Rather than overturn Es-
tes, however, Chandler distinguished the earlier decision, applied
the traditional test, and found television coverage to be within con-
stitutional due process requirements. Hence, the distinction be-
tween the different press media apparently established in Estes
disappeared.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Chandler v.
Florida has, essentially, updated Estes. As will be explained, the
Court's 1981 perceptions of the "function and effect" of television,
24. Estes, 381 U.S. at 590 (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. The "objective" of the First Amendment is protection of the press as an information
disbursing and democracy promoting institution. The "objective" of the Sixth Amendment,
in this context, is the protection of defendant's due process rights by guaranteeing a "public
trial."
26. Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in Estes was aware of the distinction
made between the "techniques of public communication." 381 U.S. at 604. "The idea of
imposing upon any medium of communications the burden of justifying its presence is con-
trary to where I had always thought the presumption must lie in the area of First Amend-
ment freedoms." 381 U.S. at 615 (White, J., dissenting, emphasis added). See also A.
FRIENDLY AND R.L. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 210 (1967), henceforth, FRIENDLY AND
GOLDFARB.
27. See Gerbner, Trial by Television: Are we at the point of no return?, 63 JUDICATURE
416 (1980). Dean Gerbner has identified several of the points made herein, and has also
attempted as done here, to distinguish by "function and effect" television from newspaper
coverage.
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the rights of the accused, and the socializing, educating role of the
"press" challenged Estes' sixteen-year-old concerns about, and im-
pressions of, television." It was this conflict of modern values re-
garding media, i.e., the proper role and function of televised cover-
age of criminal trial proceedings vis-a-vis the traditional role of
newspaper coverage, rather than century-old ideals of free press
and fair trial, that resulted in the Chandler Court's granting cam-
eras freer access to the courtroom.
The fundamental purpose of this note is to examine the distinc-
tion between television and newspaper coverage alluded to in Es-
tes. It will be suggested that a traditional free-press/fair-trial anal-
ysis of modern American press access rights to criminal trial
proceedings does not suffice to explain the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Chandler. It will be shown that the traditional free-
press/fair-trial analysis does not allow the Court to consider the
desirability of allowing mass media coverage of the trial for the
dual purposes of promoting due process by protecting rights of the
accused against unfair proceedings, and controlling criminal behav-
ior while promoting respect for the criminal justice system. This
writer proposes that a broader analysis-taking into account the
distinctions implied in Estes and the objectives sought to be served
by allowing televised coverage-is the proper one to apply in bal-
ancing the fair trial rights of a criminal defendant against the
rights of the press to cover criminal proceedings.
II. The Values Served by Press Trial Coverage
In his article, "Two Models of the Criminal Process,"" cele-
28. Hundreds of articles cutting across a variety of disciplines have been written since the
Estes decision discussing the propriety of cameras in the courtroom. Several conclude that
television, in certain factual respects, as well as our understanding of its societal functions
and effects, has changed to the point where the Estes objections are no longer valid. See,
e.g., Monroe, The Case for T. V. in the Courtroom, 21 FED. COMM. B.J. 48 (1967); Wilson,
Justice in Living Color: The Case for Courtroom Television 60 A.B.A.J. 294 (1974); Loewen,
Cameras in the Courtroom: A Reconsideration, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 504 (1978); Note, Cam-
eras in the Courtroom: A Denial of Due Process?, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 853 (1978).
29. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1964), hereinaf-
ter cited as Two Models; see also, H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-
246 (1968), hereinafter cited as LIMITS. Herbert Packer, then professor of law at Stanford,
sought to create a tool for exploring the Warren Court's development of protections of ac-
cuseds' rights and its general expansion of constitutional due process. As one commentator
put it, Packer's view "supplied a cross-cutting view of the constitutional ideal as it came up
against the problem of crime and the institutions and people through whom the ideal was
expressed or resisted." Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitional Themes in
American Criminal Procedure, 25 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1974).
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brated criminal law scholar Herbert Packer sets forth a model
which serves as a framework for considering the legal evolution of
American criminal procedure.30 Packer identifies two values"
served by modern criminal procedures: Due Process values8 2 and
Crime Control values. 3 Although Packer's analysis focuses on the
development of criminal procedure alone, it can be adapted so as
to provide a foundation for better understanding the function of
press coverage of criminal trials. From that understanding, the dis-
tinction between television and newspaper coverage implied in Es-
tes can be drawn.
Like the rights of the criminally accused under the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth amendments, press rights under the
First and Sixth amendments have developed not in a vacuum, but
in a social and technological environment where particular objec-
tives are sought and values considered." Thus, the expansion or
contraction of press rights is based on the court's assessment of
objectives sought to be served through the power of the press at a
particular time. As will be shown, Packer's model can be adapted
to illustrate the values served by press coverage of criminal trials.
30. Packer, Two Models supra note 29, at 2.
31. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976) defines "value" as "something
(as a principle, quality, or entity) intrinsically valuable or desirable." Id. at 2530. The au-
thor uses the term throughout this note for two reasons. First, Herbert Packer originally
used the term and it would be confusing to deviate from that usage although the term "ob-
jective" might also be appropriate. Second, the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use
of "value" connotes a thing that may be balanced with other things. "Objective" in the
writer's view, represents a rigid thing, as is a goal, perhaps the result of balancing "values."
"Objectives" arise as a result of "values" balanced and weighed; the things referred to here
are raw materials for decision making, not finished products.
32. Packer, Two Models supra note 29, at 13-23. As explained in text accompanying
footntes 35-36 infra, Due Process values promote the development of rights constitutionally
guaranteed to the accused in the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th amendments.
33. Packer, Two Models supra note 29, at 9-12. As explained in the text accompanying
footnotes 37-39 infra. Crime Control values are attitudes which promote the rights of law-
abiding citizens to be free from crime by eliminating crime through efficient factual determi-
nation of guilt.
34. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Company, 417 U.S. 843, 875 (1974) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 184-185 (Simons and Califano eds. 1976). "[I]f you look at
the literal language in the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States it says
'Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of the press.' That's all it says on the
subject. . . . It doesn't say a word about a reporter's privilege before a grand jury [or other
modern developments regarding the modern press]. The very fact that these protections are
available is attributable to the creative works of the judiciary over the last 190 years. If you
say it's self-evident, that this was always clear, let me tell you it wasn't always so clear. If
you went back to the original understanding of our ancestors, back in the early years of the
ninteenth century, you would find that their understanding of this clause and the Constitu-
tion in their judgment allowed them to enact something called the Alien and Sedition law."
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In his Due Process Model, Packer notes a system which values
the "primacy of the individual and the complementary concept of
limitation of official power."38 This central concept is comple-
mented by several other notions: a general intolerance of any sig-
nificant margin of error in the judicial factfinding process; the ideal
of "innocent until proven guilty"; the belief that the criminal pro-
cess is the only proper forum for adjudicating the criminal issue;
and an insistance upon the state's duty to ensure that the accused
is not deprived of protections which the criminal justice system
must afford so that the innocent are not erroneously found guilty."
Just as rules of criminal procedure can be formulated to promote
Packer's Due Process interests, it is this writer's view that modern
press coverage of criminal trial proceedings affects due process in-
terests in two opposite ways: coverage helps either to ensure the
rights of the accused (Due Process Value), or to interfere with fair
adjudication of the accused (Due Process Detriment). In other
words, press coverage of a trial can, on the one hand, ensure that a
court does not exercise its power capriciously, and on the other
hand, make a fair trial impossible by precluding selection of an
impartial jury or by bringing excessive pressure on the jury to find
a particular verdict.
Packer's Crime Control Model represents the idea that "the re-
pression of criminal conduct is by far the most important function
to be performed by the criminal process."" He likens factfinding
to an assembly line."8 According to the Model, once the accused
has passed through an administrative procedure determining prob-
able guilt he should be processed through the system with a "pre-
sumption of guilt"" resulting in efficient and final disposition of
35. PACKER, LIMITS supra note 29, at 165.
36. Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the Criminal Pro-
cess, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 364 (1970). Note the difference between factually innocent and not
guilty (legally innocent). Discussion of Due Process values generally include recognition that
there are trade-offs to be made so that protections will be afforded to the factually innocent
resulting in some factually guilty being found not guilty. For instance, under the exclusion-
ary rule, evidence that a defendant actually committed a crime is suppressed if seized in an
illegal manner. While in some cases this will result in guilty persons being acquitted, the
rule has developed with the objective of preventing unconstitutional searches and seizures of
innocent persons.
37. Packer, Two Models supra note 29, at 9.
38. Id. at 11.
39. PACKER, LIMITS supra note 29, at 160. The Model proposes that an administrative
factfinding procedure is sufficient as a means of determining factual guilt or innocence. Once
the administrative procedure has determined whom of those apprehended is factually inno-
cent, the remainder should be presumed guilty, and processed through the judicial tribunal
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the case. 0
The writer views coverage of the trial process by the active press
as promoting Crime Control values in two similar ways. First, by
reporting the system's success in bringing a criminal to justice, the
press educates the public as to the efficacy of the criminal justice
system, in the end showing that "crime does not pay." This, in
turn, deters criminal activity."' Second, the press makes trial par-
ticipants cognizant of public interest regarding the case. Where
public sentiment 2 is against the defendant and is conveyed by the
press to trial participants," as in coverage of a trial involving a
particularly heinous crime, any influence 4 that coverage has com-
ports with the press' Crime Control function. Where public senti-
ment is in favor of the defendant, and is conveyed by the press to
trial participants, any influence coverage has on acquittal promotes
Crime Control since justice has been done and an innocent man
has been freed."
By using the Packer Model's approach to Due Process and
for pro forma final disposition.
40. Packer, Two Models supra note 29, at 10.
41. As one mass media expert put it: "Popular entertainment and news via mass media
present the conventional cultural pressures of the social order." Gerbner, supra note 27, at
417. In discussing why television should be allowed in the courtroom, Carl Stern, NBC News
legal affairs correspondant and attorney, noted that what viewers "might learn about what
someone has been up to is a valuable disincentive to anti-social behavior." Does television
make a fair trial impossible?-a debate, 64 JUDICATURE 145,146 (1980). As will be discussed,
the deterence effect may only result where the court's judgement has "the appearance of
justice." See text accompanying notes 163-168, infra.
42. Public interest is distinguished from public sentiment in this context. Press coverage
of a trial will occur where there is public interest in that trial, for whatever reason, be it the
notoriety of the defendant or victim, the character of the crime, or the interests of the time.
L. DENNISTON, THE REPORTER AND THE LAW: TECHNIQUES OF COVERING THE COURTS 111
(1980). As members of the society, trial participants, it is contended, are able to perceive the
reason for the particular case's newsworthiness, and to the extent their perceptions conform
to existing public sentiment, press coverage can convey that sentiment.
Where pretrial publicity of all kinds has created intense public feeling which is
aggravated by the telecasting or picturing of the trial, the televised jurors cannot
help but feel the pressures of knowing that friends and neighbors have their eyes
upon them. If the community be hostile to an accused a television juror, realizing
that he must return to neighbors who saw the trial themselves, may well be led
"not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the
accused.
Estes, 381 U.S. at 545. See comments in footnote 141, infra.
43. Surely the very presence of press attention and to some degree the actual content of
coverage of the trial will do this.
44. The fact that we cannot measure this influence does not mean it is not substantial.
45. Compare this with the widely held view that the judicial adjudication process should
be insulated from pressure of public sentiment.
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Crime Control, the writer suggests that the Court's attitude toward
pretrial and trial press coverage and publicity can be explained as
a function of its sensitivity to these two values and its perception
of the power of the press to serve them. 6 Recognizing that newspa-
per and television are able to serve to different degrees Due Pro-
cess and Crime Control values helps provide an explanation of the
"dual" press access rule seemingly created by the Estes decision.
Therefore, what seemed to be the return of the Court to a single
standard for determining press access rights in Chandler was actu-
ally the result of a reassessment of objectives the Court seeks to
serve by press coverage.
III. Estes and Chandler Reach Different
Conclusions About the Same Potential Risks
A. The Risks
It is unnecessary for this note to determine whether or not Estes
really announced a per se rule excluding cameras from the criminal
courtroom." Six of the eight Justices participating in the Chandler
decision announced that Estes did not create such a rule. More-
over, a unanimous Court in Chandler declined to take the opportu-
nity to create such a rule. It will be shown that even though it
ruled that Estes did not create a per se rule, the Court in Chan-
dler did not adequately address the concerns voiced in the various
Estes opinions which led the earlier Court to assume prejudicial
impact without requiring an actual showing."' Even though both
Estes and Chandler acknowledged the same potential risks inher-
ent in television coverage, the Chandler Court's failure to assume
46. See Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial
Proceedings 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899 (1978). Also Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial From
Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Be-
yond, 29 STAN. L. REv. 393, 394 (1977).
47. Such a rule would make unnecessary a trial court's search for prejudicial impact
before banning cameras from the courtroom.
48. Note the distinction between a per se rule and an assumption of prejudicial impact.
According to Chandler, the Court in Estes searched for prejudicial impact caused by cam-
eras in the courtroom. Although there was no showing of such an impact it was assumed to
exist. The Court in Estes exercised its discretion as it had done in previous cases, see note
23, supra., and assumed prejudice. Under a per se rule prejudicial impact needn't be as-
sumed or shown to justify banning cameras from the courtroom.
49. See Chandler: "Inherent in electronic coverage of a trial is the risk that the very
awareness by the accused of the coverage and the contemplated broadcast may adversely
affect the conduct of the participants and the fairness of the trial, yet leave no evidence of
how the conduct or the trial's fairness was affected." 449 U.S. at 577. See Estes: "Television
in its present state and by its very nature, reaches into a variety of areas in which it may
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that television cameras' presence had a prejudicial impact makes
the Chandler and Estes decisions seem analytically incongrous. It
will be shown that applying the Model set out above as an expla-
nation of the Court's decision making in both Chandler and Estes
eliminates this incongruity and allows a more realistic understand-
ing of the nature of press access to criminal trial proceedings.
In finding that Estes had not established a per se rule banning
cameras from the courtroom, Chief Justice Burger gave substantial
weight to Harlan's swing vote in Estes. 0 Finding that "[n]othing
of the 'Roman circus' or 'Yankee Stadium' atmosphere, as in Estes,
prevailed here [in Chandler],"' the Chandler Court required a
showing of probable prejudice caused by the camera's presence
before the conviction would be overturned. Thus, the Court elimi-
nated what seemed to be the holding in Estes, that the mere pres-
ence of cameras created a "subtle" psychological impact" on trial
participants of Constitutional proportions, warranting an absolute
ban on their presence in the courtroom. The fact is, though, that
each of the concurring opinions in Estes found the unseen psycho-
logical impact of the camera's presence determinative in the
outcome. 3
Justice Clark's Opinion of the Court in Estes found the camera's
presence "inherently suspect,"5 " and Chief Justice Warren's con-
curring opinion found that television has an "inevitable impact"
caused not by "the noise and appearance of the cameras but [by]
the trial participants' awareness that they are being televised. To
the extent that television has such an inevitable impact, it under-
cuts the reliability of the trial process."55 Justice Harlan's critical
swing opinion found that the distinction between newspaper and
cause prejudice to an accused." 381 U.S. at 544.
50. See note 13, supra.
51. 449 U.S. at 582. But, see notes 131-132 and accompanying text, infra.
52. 381 U.S. at 545.
53. The Chandler Court believed only that "the concurring opinions in Estes expressed
concern that the very presence of media cameras . . . at a trial inescapably gives rise to an
adverse psychological impact on the participants in the trial." 449 U.S. at 575.
54. "No prejudice was shown [in prior cases applying the "inherently prejudicial" stan-
dard] but the circumstances were held to be inherently suspect, and, therefore, such a
showing [of actual prejudice] was not held to be a requisite to reversal . . . [Tihe applica-
tion of the principle is . . . appropriate [in this case]. Television in its present state and by
its very nature, reaches into a variety of areas in which it may cause prejudice to the ac-
cused. Still one cannot put his finger on its specific mischief and prove with particularity
wherein he was prejudiced." 381 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added).
55. 381 U.S. at 570.
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television "turn not on differences of size and shape but of func-
tion and effect."56 Harlan's perception of the camera's influence
did not stem from what he believed was their minimal physical
presence in the Estes courtroom:
Some preliminary observations are in order: All would agree, I am
sure, that at its worst, television is capable of distorting the trial
process so as to deprive it of fundamental fairness. Cables, klieg
lights, interviews with the principal participants, commentary on
their performances, 'commercials' at frequent intervals, special
wearing apparel and make-up for the trial participants-certainly
such things would not conduce to the sound administration of
justice by any acceptable standard. But that is not the case
before us. We must judge television as we find it in this
trial-relatively unobtrusive, with the cameras contained in a
booth at the back of the courtroom.57
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Chandler also focused on
the problem: "The violation [in Estes] inhered, [not from physicial
disruption but] rather, in the hypothesis that the mere presence of
cameras and recording devices might have an effect on the trial
participants prejudicial to the accused."58
Although the Chandler Court acknowledged the same inherent
risks found in Estes, it took a different approach. The Court bifur-
cated its discussion of the impact of mass media, first concluding
that the risk of juror prejudice caused by print or broadcast press
coverage in some cases does not justify an absolute ban on news
coverage."' The Court then faced the "concern" expressed in Estes
"that the very presence of media camera and recording devices at a
trial inescapably gives rise to an adverse psychological impact on
56. 381 U.S. at 590.
57. 381 U.S. at 588 (emphasis added here and by Justice Stewart in Chandler, 449 U.S. at
584.
58. 449 U.S. at 584.
59. "An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified
simply because there is a danger that, in some cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts of pre-
trial and trial events may impair the ability of jurors to decide the issue of guilt or inno-
cence uninfluenced by extraneous matter. The risk of juror prejudice in some cases does not
justify an absolute ban on news coverage of trials by the printed media; so also the risk of
such prejudice does not warrant an absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast coverage. A
case attracts a high level of public attention because of its intrinsic interest to the public
and the manner of reporting the event. The risk of juror prejudice is present in any publica-
tion of a trial, but the appropriate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant's right
to demonstrate that the media's coverage of his case-be it printed or broad-
cast-compromised the ability of the particular jury that heard the case to adjudicate
fairly." 449 U.S. at 574-75.
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participants in the trial."60 Instead of assuming inherent prejudice
in the camera's presence the Court asked that it be "demonstrated
that the mere presence of photographic and recording equipment
and the knowledge that the event would be broadcast invariably
and uniformly affect[s] the conduct of participants so as to impair
fundamental fairness" before "prohibition of broadcast coverage of
trials would be required.""
Without explaining why they were no longer applicable, Chan-
dler left behind the assumptions made in Estes about cameras'
prejudicial impact on the trial proceedings. Even if Estes were de-
cided solely on its facts, considering what was by today's standards
the substantial physical distraction caused by the camera's pres-
ence, it does not follow that the psychological impact is eliminated
simply because today's cameras are not physically obtrusive." Yet
the Court in Chandler summarily dismissed unsubstantiated asser-
tions about the prejudicial psychological impact of cameras in the
courtroom while the Estes Court did not.
Although both Courts noted potential risks inherent in television
coverage, neither established precisely what those risks were or
how they differ from those inherent in newspaper coverage. Nor
did Chandler make entirely clear what benefits would outweigh the
problems created by these risks. Since Estes perceived these risks
to be more serious and the benefits to be of lesser importance than
did Chandler, the earlier Court chose to limit the access of televi-
sion to the courtroom.
B. The Access Accorded
Before discussing the Court's shift in perception of the newspa-
per and television media in Chandler and the proper role of each
in covering criminal trial proceedings, it is important to establish
the difference between the level of access accorded to the two types
of press.
The press has traditionally been allowed access to criminal pro-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. "It can accurately be asserted that television technology has advanced in the past 15
years, and that Americans are now much more familiar with that medium of communica-
tion. It does not follow, however, that the 'subtle capacities for serious mischief' are today
diminished, or that the 'imponderables of the trial arena' are now less elusive." Id. at 585.
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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ceedings equal to that afforded the general public." However, if
press activity creates "clear and present danger" to the administra-
tion of justice, restraints may be imposed.6' The Supreme Court's
ruling in Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia,6 5 states that only
under extra-ordinary circumstances" may the public-and the
press-be excluded from criminal trial proceedings.
To understand the distinction between television and newspaper
coverage created by Estes, it is important to note the impact of the
"access equal to that afforded the general public" rule on newspa-
per and television coverage. Although this press access standard is
applied to both newspaper and television, its impact on each is
different.
Newspaper coverage of an event naturally includes the written
word, photographs and illustrations. It is impossible to present ac-
tive audio or visual reproductions of the event through the print
medium. The medium is limited to the visual reproduction of word
and still picture. For this reason, allowing a newspaper journalist
access to an event equal to that afforded the general public has a
minimal detrimental impact on the newspaper's ability to cover
the event. Although a still camera may not be permitted in a court-
room, for instance, a sketch artist or note-taker is. The resulting
artist's rendition and reporter's text provides all that the medium
itself allows.
Television coverage of an event includes the spoken word, still
photographs, illustrations, and live or recorded broadcast of the
event itself. While television utilizes the printed word, either as
captioning or as text from which a correspondent reads, and still
photographs or artist's renditions, application of the press access
rule to broadcasters prevents coverage by the medium's most effec-
tive means-broadcast of the event itself. 7
To assert, as in Estes, that "television and radio reporter[s have]
63. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609-610 (1978); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-685 (1972); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 540; Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
64. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 372 (1947); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496,
507 (1972).
65. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
66. Id. at 581: "Absent on overriding interest articulated in facts, the trial of a criminal
case must be open to the public."
67. "Full and effective television news coverage is not covering a trial with an artist and
sketch pad." Wilson, supra note 28, at 296.
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the same privilege [of access as newspapers]," * is to misunder-
stand the modern American press. A newspaper reporter may view
a proceeding, leave the courtroom and portray the scene in words
or sketch as best as his medium allows. However, the television
reporter, without his camera, cannot cover the trial proceedings
with analogous comprehensiveness. To say that all members of the
press have equal access to the trial event even though newspaper
reporters are not allowed to bring their typewriters or printing
press and television reporters are not allowed to bring their cam-
eras, as done in Estes,"9 is to confuse the means of capturing the
occurrence with the instrument used to distribute it for mass con-
sumption. For this reason, the holding in Estes, while applying the
same press access rule, cannot be seen as perpetuating television
access equal to that of the public or newspapers.70 Although Estes
declares that the same rule is being applied to both arms of the
68. 381 U.S. at 540.
69. Id. The Estes Court's opinion dismisses the argument advanced by Texas that not
requiring a showing of probable prejudice as a result of the camera's presence is to discrimi-
nate between the press media, saying: "Nor can the courts be said to discriminate where
they permit the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom. The television and radio re-
porter has the same privilege. All are entitled to the same rights as the general public. The
news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press." 381 U.S. at 540.
Obviously a newspaper reporter can cover a trial superbly without bringing his typewriter or
printing press into the courtroom. While a television reporter may be able to cover a trial
without a camera, the "power" of his coverage is drastically limited by such a rule.
70. The Estes Court's holding skirted the media discrimination question when it stated,
"reporters of all media, including television, are always present if they wish to be and are
plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court through their respective media." 381
U.S. at 541-542. To properly address the question the Court should have said, "Yes, all
reporters are free to report whatever they see in open court, but we believe that despite the
benefits of being able to view court proceedings through television, the detriments of cam-
eras in the courtroom preclude their presence. Pad and pencil will have to suffice."
Perhaps the best example of the Supreme Court explicitly distinguishing between news-
paper access rights and access rights of the broadcast press can be found in Nixon v. Warner
Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In that case broadcast journalists sought access to the
actual sound recording of ex-President Nixon's office conversations. Although the tapes had
been transcribed, the Court refused to allow broadcasters access to the actual tape record-
ings. The Court held that neither the First nor Sixth Amendment required release of the
actual tapes. 435 U.S. at 608. The press had been free during the trial to "publish or utilize"
the testimony and exhibits in evidence [as it saw fit]. The Court held that "no restrictions
[were placed] upon press access to, or publication of, any information in the public domain."
435 U.S. at 609. "Thus, the issue presented in this case is not whether the press must be
permitted access to public information to which the public generally is guaranteed access,
but whether these copies of the White House tapes-to which the public has never had
physical access-must be made available for copying." Id.
In Warner Communcations the Court properly acknowledged the difference between
press access generally and access of the broadcast press to material in a particular form
wihich the broadcast press alone could make use of-the aural recording itself.
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press, as a matter of degree Estes' impact on the ability of the
televised press to cover a trial is greater than that on the print
press: broadcast coverage is allowed only to the extent newspaper
coverage is allowed.
Because of the incongruent impact of an application of the same
rule on television and newspapers, despite the Court's insistence to
the contrary in Estes, both Estes and Chandler effectively distin-
guish two "presses" for the purposes of trial access: newspaper and
television.1 Before Estes, newspapers were given access to a trial
to protect the due process rights of the accused. Newspapers'
handicap was, and continues to be, an ability, when used abusively,
to overpublicize a defendant's case prior to trial72 so as to actually
endanger the defendant's due process rights. The Estes Court im-
plicitly recognized another "press"-television-whose "function
and effect"73 distinguished it from newspaper coverage and made
its mere presence in the Estes' courtroom an insidious threat74 to
the adjudication process, requiring automatic expulsion from the
courtroom. In Chandler, the Court merely said that television may
cause prejudicial results. However, until research indicates other-
wise," television will be given access to the courtroom.
Two questions arise from this judicial evolution. First, why did
the Estes Court recognize a distinction between television and
newspapers beyond that of physical intrusiveness?7 7 Second, why
71. Mr. Lawrence H. Rogers II, the past president of Taft Broadcasting Co., noted the
distinction in a March 25, 1965 address to the American Civil Liberties Union in Cincinnati,
Ohio. He stated: "It is unmistakably clear that 'free press' is intended to encompass any
means of public dissemination of information, including those electronic miracles that had
not yet been invented at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights . . . . Accordingly,
the indiscriminate banning of cameras and microphones from courtrooms, while at the same
time free access is accorded to all purveyors of private opinion by pad and pencil, is on its
face a violation of the first amendment." Free Press and Fair Trial Hearings 7.
72. J. LOFTON, JUSTICE AND THE PRESS 135 (1966). See also Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S.
at 575.
73. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 590.
74. Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 ROCKY MTN. L.R. 1 (1960). See also
381 U.S. at 541.
75. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. at 576 n.11.
76. Although the Court in Chandler does not explicitly state its modification of the press
access rule, it appears that by allowing cameras into the courtroom, the press, including
both newspaper and television, is now given access to the criminal courtroom greater than
that accorded the general public. On the other hand, it may be argued that the camera's
presence is just the presence of another member of the public, benignly viewing the court's
operation.
77. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 545-549. The Court's opinion pointed out three ways
in which it was assumed the television camera's presence had a psychological influence on
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did Estes assume prejudice while Chandler demanded a showing of
prejudice?
The answers to these questions can be found by applying the
Packer Due Process/Crime Control Model. By recognizing the dif-
ferences between the two types of press coverage and acknowledg-
ing the existence of a medium-specific right of press access, Estes
and Chandler can simply be viewed as reflections of changing atti-
tudes about the different media rather than applications of the
traditional free-press/fair-trial analysis with incongruent results.
IV. Dynamic Perceptions of the Functions of
Television and Newspaper Trial Coverage: The
Estes' Perceptions
Although no direct mention is made of it, the courts have as-
sessed the objectives served by the particular medium seeking ac-
cess when considering questions of press access to the courtroom.7 8
Traditionally, access to criminal proceedings has been liberally af-
forded the print medium. The full force of First Amendment pro-
tection, however, is clearly applicable only to the limited mass me-
dia of colonial days.7 9 It will be shown that the Court in Estes
assumed prejudice because the Justices perceived the effect of tele-
vised coverage differently from those effects traditionally recog-
nized as legitimate under the First and Sixth Amendments: tele-
vised coverage was perceived as having great Due Process
the trial process. See text accompanying notes 105 through 107, infra. The Court has never
assumed extensive newspaper coverage to have similar effects. For instance, in Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the Court concluded that the tremendous publicity surround-
ing the crime and courtroom proceedings created a "Roman holiday" atmosphere at trial
and prevented fair adjudication. The Court did not say that the mere presence of newspaper
reporters robbed the defendant of due process. The Court in Estes, however, did not merely
find the cameras physically disruptive, but went further, without supporting evidence, to
outline three specific adverse psychological influences mentioned above. The different ap-
proaches taken by the Court to restrict one medium and not the other arise from the
Court's different perceptions of the two different media, not the "press" generally.
78. See Kaufman, The Medium, The Message and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L.R.
761 (1970).
79. While the freedom of the press is modernly viewed as applicable to all mass media,
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-502 (1952), it is important to recognize
that the freedom is premised on the power and uses of the print medium press. "In order to
understand the meaning of 'freedom of the press' to the framers of the First Amendment,
one must consider the history of restraint upon the written and spoken word." American
Newspaper Publishers Association, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 15 (1967) (Emphasis added).
Thus, traditional views of the press' roles in covering trials are found on the print press
functioning and effects.
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Detriment and Crime Control Value-the latter virtually unac-
knowledged under traditional standards of press rights.
An exposition of the objectives sought and the values perceived
to be served by newspaper and television coverage is necessary to
explain why Estes was decided the way it was. It will be shown
that, as a general proposition, the traditional view of the press'
function in the courtroom emphasizes a press high" in Due Pro-
cess Value and low in Due Process Detriment; the Crime Control
Value being inconsequential. Newspaper coverage, as it has been
perceived both traditionally and modernly, conforms to this norm;
it is viewed as possessing high Due Process Value, low Due Process
Detriment and inconsequential Crime Control Value.81 Televised
coverage does not conform to the norm as easily, for it is tradition-
ally viewed as possessing low Due Process Value, high Due Process
Detriment and high Crime Control Value.82 The writer will not at-
tempt to assess the validity of these views, only to establish their
existence.
A. Newspapers are viewed as high in Due Process
Value, low in Due Process Detriment, and having in-
consequential Crime Control Value
It has long been the view that newspapers have the ability to
promote due process in the criminal justice system and govern-
ment in general.88 Towards this end, the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that "the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to public trial."" The original purpose of the
Amendment was to protect a defendant from "Star Chamber" pro-
80. In discussing the degrees to which Due Process and Crime Control values are served
by the press media, the terms "high" and "low" will be used. These are relative terms,
conclusory in nature, used to indicate the perception of the particular medium in question.
It is important only for the reader of this note to associate "high" with "greater extent of
the value served" and "low" with "lesser extent of the value served."
81. See text accompanying notes 83-96, infra.
82. See text accompanying notes 97-115, infra.
83. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book 4 ch. II, 151-152
(1765-1769); L.W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON (1966); J.
MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800, 225-227 (J. Randolph ed. 1850); T.I. EMER-
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATIONS TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). Justice Powell put it well: "The beneficial influence
of news coverage of the proceedings in the administration of justice is apparent. Unstinted
public criticism is one of the most effective checks on abuse of power. A diligent and en-
lightened press can afford substantial protection to a person accused of a crime." Powell,
The Right to a Fair Trial, 51 A.B.A.J. 534 (1965).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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ceedings and to guarantee access to counsel, family, and friends
during the criminal proceeding.85 Over the years it has become rec-
*ognized that the press acts as a "surrogate public";" its access
serves to protect a defendant's rights.
The importance of newspaper coverage to the due process rights
of the accused was recognized even in Sheppard v. Maxwell,"7 the
landmark decision overturning a murder conviction because of
prejudicial press publicity.
A responsible press has always [even before the advent of televi-
sion] been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial ad-
ministration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this
regard is documented by an impressive record of service over sev-
eral centuries. The press does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against miscarriage of justice by subject-
ing the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive
public scrutiny and criticism.88
The newspaper, therefore, can be said to be high in Due Process
Value.
Much has been said of the adverse influence that extensive pre-
trial press coverage of notorious trials can have on the fair-trial/
due process rights of the accused.89 However, only a showing of
clear and present danger of obstructing the orderly and fair admin-
istration of justice will result in restrictions on newspapers during
trial.90 Newspaper coverage of the trial, then, is not a violation of
defendant's due process rights per se; only when coverage breaches
the strict clear and present danger standard may restraints be im-
posed by the court. Couched in the terminology of the Model,
newspaper coverage of criminal proceedings has traditionally been,
and still is, viewed as possessing insufficient Due Process Detri-
85. Brief of Appellant at 16, Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). See generally, MA-
GRUDER AND CLAIR, THE CONSTITUTION 273-274 (1933) and MATHEWS, THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL SYSTEM 346 (1932); Radin, The Right to Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1932). See
also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 539 and 583 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
86. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, at 573 (1980).
87. 384 U.S. 333 (1965).
88. Id. at 350.
89. See generally, American Newspaper Publishers Association, FREE PRESS AND FAIR
TRIAL (1967).
90. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347
(1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947). Interpreting the "clear and present dan-
ger" standard as applied to restrictive orders, the court in United States v. Dickenson, 465
F.2d 496, 507 (1972) held that such an order will result where there is an imminent threat to
the administration of justice which is neither remote nor improbable but which immediately
imperils the administration of a fair trial.
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ment to outweigh the Due Process Value achieved by newspaper
coverage. Clear outright abuse by the newspaper reporter is neces-
sary to establish an infringement of due process under the stan-
dard stated above; his or her mere attentive presence, pen in hand,
will not alone suffice.9 1
Unlike other benefits and detriments there has been little recog-
nition in case law of a Crime Control impact associated with print
coverage of trial proceedings." In the context of criminal proceed-
ings, whatever Crime Control impact has been attributed to the
print media has arisen out of its after-the-fact publication of di-
verse views and dissemination of raw information regarding the
trial.93 It has not been viewed as arising out of reporters' on-the-
spot presence at the proceedings, and not at all out of any teaching
inherent in the very nature of the medium, i.e., writing about an
event later does not provide a direct window into the processes of
justice, providing its own form of public education without inter-
pretation by an intermediary, the reporter/writer.
Newspapers provide interpretive renditions of events; the old ax-
iom "never believe what you read in the newspapers," applies to
the print medium in a way unknown to television," for television
allows the viewer to see and hear an event, to glean his own mean-
ing and attach his own significance to whatever is seen." Since
91. Even jurors' knowledge of newspaper articles unfavorable to the defendant will not
upset the verdict in a trial without a showing of actual prejudice. Murphy v. Florida, 421
U.S. 794, 800-802 (1974). It is interesting, however, to note that in its decision to allow
television cameras access to the trial courtroom, Florida's Supreme Court said "[jiust as
electronic media broadcast may contaminate a prospective venire, so may extensive newspa-
per coverage." In re Post-Newsweek Stations of Florida, Inc., 370 So.2d 764, 777 (Fla. 1979).
See also Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 ROCKY MTN. L.R. 1, 2 (1960). In
discussing the debate over television camera access to trials Justice Douglas stated: ".
[T]he influence of the newspaper on trials should [not] go unnoticed."
92. As noted above, supra. text accompanying notes 83-88, the purpose for which the
press originally was granted access to the courtroom was to act as a due process guarantor.
The traditional view is expressed in the comments of James Mill in 1825 when he said that
a free press serves three essential functions: 1) to provide the voters with information to
form the basis for intelligent choice, 2) to make the conduct of the rulers known to the
people and 3) to bring to the attention of the rulers current public opinion with respect to
improvements in government. J. MILL, ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT, JURISPRUDENCE, LIBERTY OF
THE PRESS AND LAW OF NATIONS -19, 28 (1825).
93. Only by reporting courts' activities, i.e., the "doing of justice," does the newspaper
reporter help deter crime. Such an effect does not, unlike the Due Process Value, arise by
the mere presence of a reporter or even the threat of a reporter's presence. See text accom-
panying note 154, infra.
94. " 'Some People Believe Anything They See' on T. V.," U.S. News & World Report,
May 21, 1979, at 52.
95. The old adage "seeing is believing" is particularly applicable to this point. Id. It may
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traditional judicial notions of objectives to be served by press cov-
erage were originally framed with newspapers in mind, these no-
tions are "caliberated" to the socializing influence of the newspa-
per and do not adequately recognize the comparatively great
socializing influence of television. As a result, in the courts' tradi-
tional view, newspaper coverage as compared to television does not
provide a strong socializing influence, though there is no doubt
that it has some." In terms of the Model, therefore, newspapers
have inconsequential Crime Control Value.
B. Television is viewed as low in Due Process
Value, high in Due Process Detriment and high in
Crime Control Value
It has been argued that the more "public" the trial, the more the
rights of the accused are protected. Under this argument, allowing
a larger community to watch trial proceedings through the televi-
sion camera's lens should serve Due Process Value to a relatively
greater degree.
The Court in Estes spoke about the tremendous gallery created
by television coverage and rejected the notion that such increased
public exposure enhances due process.97 Justice Harlan directly ad-
dressed the argument and repudiated its merit, saying "[a] trial in
Yankee Stadium, even if the crowd sat in stony silence, would be a
substantially different affair from a trial in a traditional courtroom
under traditional conditions, and the difference would not, I think,
be argued that deletive editing alters the viewers' perception of the actual event. This may
be true. Minor deletive editing may vastly alter the "meaning" of the broadcast. But unlike
the impression a reader gets from an edited newspaper story, the television news viewer sees
the event and must be able to dismiss the idea that "seeing is believing" if he is to minimize
the effect of deletive editing. Such preconceptions about the truth of things seen vis-a-vis
things read about are hard to dismiss. See note 94, supra.
96. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 170-78 (1964). McLuhan
at once recognizes the socializing, homogenizing influence of the print medium, yet distin-
guishes its influence from that of the electronic medium, saying: "Political unification of
populations by means of vernacular and language groupings was unthinkable before printing
turned each vernacular into an extensive mass medium. The tribe, an extended form of a
family of blood relatives, is exploded by print, and is replaced by an association of men
homogeneously trained to be individuals. Nationalism itself came as an intense new visual
image of group destiny and status, and depended on a speed of information movement un-
known before printing. Today nationalism as an image still depends on the press but has all
the electronic media against it." Id. at 177, emphasis added.
97. "A defendant on trial . . . is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or
nationwide arena. The heightened public clamour resulting from radio and television cover-
age will inevitably result in prejudice." Id. at 544.
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be that the witnesses, lawyers, judges, and jurors in the stadium
would be more truthful, diligent, and capable of reliably finding
facts and determining guilt or innocence."98 Harlan was convinced
that "it is impossible to believe that the reliability of a trial as a
method of finding facts and determining guilt or innocence in-
creases in relation to the size of the crowd who is watching it."**
Thus, the Supreme Court in Estes decided that televising trials
does not enhance the due process rights of the accused, i.e., tele-
vised coverage is low in Due Process Value. Further, the Court rec-
ognized a prejudicial impact in exposing juries, through the cam-
era's lens, to the weight of community sentiment, at least in
notorious cases. "To increase the possibility of influence and the
danger of a 'popular verdict' by subjecting the jurors to the view of
a mass audience whose approach to the case has been conditioned
by pretrial publicity can only make a bad situation worse."100 Tele-
vising trials "would do nothing to ensure greater fairness than ex-
isting media scrutiny could not do."101
On the facts before the Estes Court, four Justices made it clear
that televised coverage inherently violated the due process rights
of the accused by disrupting court proceedings. 02 First, the Jus-
tices said that twelve cameramen and "[c]ables and wires . . .
snaked across the courtroom floor" 03 during pretrial proceedings
created a physical distraction. And, even though, a special booth
was constructed to hide the cameras during the trial,10' their pres-
ence was physically disruptive of the dignity and decorum of the
trial court. Thus, the Estes opinion viewed the television camera's
presence as inherently high in Due Process Detriment.
The opinion is concerned with more than physical obtrusiveness
in noting the detrimental effects of television on Due Process. Psy-
chological disruption of the trial participants was cited as a second
98. Id. at 595.
99. Id. One proponent of cameras in the courtroom distinguishes between stadium trials
and televised trials: "A trial unfolding before 100,000 people in a stadium or a coliseum is a
phenomenon far different from one conducted in a decorous courtroom under careful rules
with 100,000 people looking on from their living rooms. The first is spectacle; the second is
witness." Davis, Television in our courtrooms: the advantages, the unproven dangers, 64
JUDICATURE 85, 87 (1980).
100. 381 U.S. at 592.
101. Gerbner, supra note 27, at 418.
102. 381 U.S. at 544.
103. Id. at 536.
104. Id. at 537.
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interference with the rights of the defendant to a fair trial. The
Court found: (1) that jurors become self-conscious and are exposed
to undue community scrutiny by the presence of the cameras;10 '
(2) that cameras influence witness behavior and hence the reliabil-
ity of testimony;10 and (3) that cameras subject defendants to "a
form of mental-if not physical-harassment, resembling a police
line-up or third degree."10 It was this additional psychological dis-
ruption that had to be resolved in Chandler before the camera
could be allowed in the criminal courtroom.
Unlike that of print coverage, the strong Crime Control impact
of television coverage was recognized even by the Estes Court as a
"credible policy [argument] in favor of television" access.108 Today,
it is widely recognized as perhaps the strongest argument for cam-
eras in the courtroom.109 Television coverage of the actual judicial
event, showing a "competent defense counsel, witnesses, and a jury
charged with a frightening task, all going about their public duties
in an orderly, dignified, . . . efficient and legal manner,"110 has a
definite educative impact on the public. Such a showing would en-
hance the dignity of the court, promote respect for the process of
criminal adjucation,"n and deter criminal activity by showing
criminals captured, prosecuted and punished. Even Justice Harlan
in his concurring opinion in Estes thought that "television is capa-
ble of performing an educational function by acquainting the pub-
lic with the judicial process in action.""'
Television may be the only medium in modern society capable of
allowing "the public [to] judge whether our system of criminal jus-
105. Id. at 545.
106. Id. at 547.
107. Id. at 549.
108. Id. at 589. "[Tjelevision coverage can be infinitely more informative and revealing
than news reports filtered through the minds of even the best reporters." Davis, Television
in our courts: the proven advantages, the unproven dangers, 64 JUDICATURE, 85, 86 (1980).
109. See Wilson and Monroe, supra note 28.
110. Remarks of Colorado Chief Judge Frank H. Hall reported in Wilson, supra note 28,
at 296.
111. Id. at 295. It may be argued by opponents that as long as trial participants are made
uncomfortable by camera coverage, the electronic media cannot portray real impressions of
the trial process. This note does not assess the value of conflicting arguments. However,
proponents would argue that 1) there would be no distraction if electronic media were al-
lowed regular access, 2) cameras could be made absolutely invisible to the courtroom par-
ticipants, and 3) the other press media will bring the public eye to bear on the newsworthy
trial, so why worry about an unseen camera. See text accompanying notes 135-141 infra.
112. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 589.
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tice is fair and right."' By showing what many would call the
choking effect of legal technicalities on judicial efficiency, for in-
stance, televised coverage could promote Crime Control by creating
a public more eager to find legally guilty those who appear factu-
ally guilty.
However, it has been noted that the judiciary's "primary func-
tion is not to entertain nor even to educate or edify the public but
to ascertain and enforce the very rights involved."1 14 For this rea-
son, Justice Harlan, concurring in Estes, believed that the educa-
tive Crime Control quality of television carried "little weight"115 in
promoting the use of cameras in the courtroom.
V. A Change in Judicial Attitudes Toward
Televised Coverage: Chandler's Perceptions
The Estes decision stood for three main propositions: 1) the ex-
ercise of press freedom must necessarily "be subject to the mainte-
nance of absolute fairness in the judicial process"; so 2) television
coverage.does not protect a defendant's due process rights in any
way not already afforded by newspaper coverage;117 and 3) televis-
ing the trial was "inherently suspicious" as possibly affecting ad-
versely the trial court's factfinding process.118
Since Estes, attitudes toward the due process rights of the ac-
cused,119 the ability of the print media properly to cover a trial, the
113. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950), cited in Rich-
mond Newspaper v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 574 n.9. Also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
114. American Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on Televising and
Broadcasting Legislative and Judicial Proceedings, 77 A.B.A. Rep. 607, 610 (1952).
115. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 594.
116. Id. at 539.
117. Id. at 583-586.
118. Id. at 544.
119. During the years 1961 to 1970, the Warren Court promoted due process values in
developing procedural protections for the criminally accused. See, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The Warren Court in deciding Estes was imbued
with a strong concern for protecting due process rights. Its view of television's Due Process
Detriment precluded its recognition of any Crime Control or educative value of the medium.
See, Casenote, Television in the Court Room: Estes v. Texas, 6 SANTA CLARA LAw. 109,
114 (1965): "In recent years there has been an increasing sensitivity, at least in the Supreme
Court, for the need to guarantee a criminal defendant's right to due process of law. In the
area of prejudicial publicity this concern centers around a realization of the subconscious
effect on the jurors of extra-judicial influences, with the resultant inability of the defendant
to prove with any particularity wherein he was prejudiced." Burger Court decisions "reflect
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"inherently suspicious" effect of television on trial participants,
and the desirability of allowing an instantaneous medium into the
courtroom, have changed.n1 0 At the time of the Chandler decision,
ten states permitted television coverage on a permanent basis,"'
sixteen on an experimental basis,122 and nine were considering al-
lowing coverage.12 8
The Supreme Court'2 4 in Chandler had the opportunity to re-
think the conclusions it drew in Estes, to decide whether "televi-
sion [has] become so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the
average person as to eliminate all reasonable likelihood that its use
in courtrooms may disparage the judicial process."12 5 Indeed, the
Court made just that determination.
a prevalent theme-a preoccupation with accurate results in individual cases, and a disre-
gard of procedures that protect the integrity of the process in ways unrelated to factfind-
ing." Chase, The Burger Court, The Individual and The Criminal Process: Directions and
Misdirections 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 518, 519 (1977).
120. The Burger Court's views on issues, particularly those involving due process, are dif-
ferent from those of the Warren Court. Since 1970, the Court has adjusted the balance
between Due Process and Crime Control objectives, giving the latter more credence. It is not
surprising, then, that the Crime Control minded Burger Court in Chandler found nothing
inherently objectionable in televised coverage. The Court simply recognized the Crime Con-
trol value of the televised medium, found it desirable, and gave it sufficient weight to
counter-balance the weight accorded defendant's rights in its prior decisions. See Chase,
The Burger Court, The Individual, and The Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirec-
tions, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 518, (1977); George, From Warren to Burger to Chance: Future
Trends in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 69 MIL. L. Ray. 1 (1975), 12 C.L.B. 253
(1976); Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court,
775 MICH. L. REV. 1319 (1977).
121. States allowing coverage on a permanent basis with varying degrees of consent re-
quired from the parties include Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, New Hamp-
shire, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Brief of Appellants, Appendix at AB-
5-6, Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
122. States allowing coverage on an experimental basis include Arizona, California, Idaho,
Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Brief of Appellants, Id. at
AB-7-9.
123. States actively considering allowing coverage include Arkansas, Connecticut, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont. Brief of Appel-
lants, Id. at AB-9.
124. Lower courts have also taken new positions with regard to non-traditional media
coverage of trials. In United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.
1974), the Court of Appeals held sketching to the same standard as other press activities in
the courtroom: unless there is a showing of likely prejudice to fair proceedings, banning such
activity is a violation of the First Amendment. See Note, U.S. v. C.B.S.: When Sketch Art-
ists are Allowed in the Courtroom, Can Photographers be Far Behind?, 1975 Duke L.J. 188.
In Bell v. Patterson, 279 F.Supp. 760 (D. Colo. 1968), the district court found that the pres-
ence of photographers at criminal trials is not a per se interference with due process rights.
Bell was cited with approval in Chandler, 449 U.S. at 579 n.12.
125. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 595.
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A. Television may no longer be viewed as possess-
ing low Due Process Value
Estes found that expansion of the "public trial" right to include
viewers outside of the courtroom was more of a threat to due pro-
cess than a force to maintain fairness. Since 1965, it has been ar-
gued that because a larger portion of the public receives its news
via television than through the print media, television must be ac-
cepted in the courtroom, as the more modern "surrogate public",
to protect the due process rights of the accused.126 The Supreme
Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia promoted the
idea of extended public trial rights as a protection of due process,
saying "a trial courtroom also is a public place where the people
generally-and representatives of the media-have a right to be
present, and where their presence historically has been thought to
enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place."" Accord-
ing to the populist thinking displayed by the Richmond Newspa-
pers Court, it would seem that absent a clear showing of prejudice,
there is never too much public access. Popular justice is proper
justice by this view.' While one could not be certain that Rich-
126. Roper polls have reported since 1963 that television is the principal source of news
for most people. See Washy, Laying Estes to Rest: A Case Note, 5 JUSTICE SYSTEM J. 58, 69
n.44 (1979). See also Wilson, supra note 28, at 294. FRIENDLY AND GOLDFARB, supra note 26,
at 211.
127. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
128. Id. at 578.
129. Interesting language is to be found in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Richmond
Newspapers, Id. at 605-606:
The proper administration of justice in any nation is bound to be a matter of the
highest concern to all thinking citizens. But to gradually rein in, as this Court has
done over the past generation, all of the ultimate decisionmaking power over how
justice shall be administered, not merely in the federal system but in each of the
50 States, is a task that no Court consisting of nine persons, however gifted, is
equal to. Nor is it desirable that such authority be exercised by such a tiny nu-
merical fragment of the 220 million people who compose the population of this
country . . . . [I]t is basically unhealthy to have so much authority concentrated
in a small group of lawyers who have been appointed to the Supreme Court. . . .
Although Justice Rehnquist was discussing states vs. federal rights in this particular section
of his dissent, the author wonders whether Justice Rehnquist would agree that the authority
for dispensing justice in America should somehow be distributed amongst the 220 million
people populating the country-or to those "thinking citizens" who populate the nation.
Would Justice Rehnquist object to the entire populace acting as jury in a trial, jurors view-
ing the trial by way of television and entering their verdict via telephone hook-up?
There exists a thin line between a judiciary that interprets the law to "satiate" the pub-
lic's demand for justice and a judiciary that interprets the law according to the public's
demands. The former is constitutionally permissible insofar as the public's demand for "jus-
tice" may be satiated even though the law is not interpreted as the majority of the populace
528 [Vol. 3
ESTES TO CHANDLER
mond Newspapers would be a precursor to a criminal trial process
open to the electronic eye,130 the result in Chandler suggests that it
was.
Chandler saw the "trial in Yankee Stadium" concerns of the Es-
tes plurality as punishment of the accused by exposing him to pub-
lic scorn before determination of guilt."' Justice Burger in Chan-
dler dismissed the concern saying, "whether coverage of a few
trials will, in practice, be the equivalent of a 'Yankee Stadium' set-
ting-which Justice Harlan likened to the public pillory long aban-
doned as a barbaric perversion of decent justice-must also await
the continuing experimentation."18 2 Such an attitude, permitting
experimentation in this area, is a clear departure from Estes,
where the Court was willing to accept, as a general proposition,
that an enlarged audience does not make for "better" justice and
that it may inhibit fairness.133 Although the Chandler Court de-
clined explicitly to accept enlarging the gallery as a bona fide bene-
fit of televised coverage," the willingness of the Court to leave the
thinks it ought to be. Implied in the theme of this note is the hope that the Court has not
opened the courtroom doors to cameras to achieve the latter of these two propostions.
130. See Davis, Television in our courts: the proven advantages, the unproven dangers,
64 JUDICATURE 85, 89 (1980). Cf. Reply Brief of Appellants, Chandler v. Florida, No. 79-1260
at 20 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1979), where it is argued: "The accused's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair and impartial trial has a preferred position in criminal proceedings. [Citations
omitted.] Nothing in the several opinions in Richmond Newspapers, Inc., supra, suggests
anything to the contrary." But consider the earlier opinion in F. SIBBERT, RIGHTS AND PRM-
LEGES OF THE PRESs 41 (1943), uninfluenced by the decision in Richmond Newspapers: "The
question of the right [of the press] to attend trials has never been directly presented to a
court of appeal in the United States, and such a case, if presented solely on the basis of
precedent without regard to present social and political theories, would be decided against
the Press." If Siebert's view is correct, there certainly has been a change in thinking about
the priority of the press' rights over those of the defendant.
131. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 580. This interpretation is erroneous. See note 132, infra.
132. Id. Harlan used the "Yankee Stadium" analogy to illustrate the proposition that a
larger gallery will not make trial participants more diligent, not as Burger uses it to show
television as a sort of modern day "public pillory". Burger misinterprets Harlan's analysis.
See Estes, 381 U.S. at 595.
133. 381 U.S. at 544-45:
As has been said, the chief function of our judicial machinery is to ascertain truth.
The use of television, however, cannot be said to contribute materially to this ob-
jective . . . [w]here pretrial publicity of all kinds has created intense public feel-
ing which is aggravated by the telecasting .or picturing of the trial the televised
jurors cannot help but feel the pressures of knowing that friends and neighbors
have their eyes upon them. If the community be hostile to an accused, a televison
juror, realizing that he must return to neighbors who saw the trial themselves,
may be led 'not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the
accused'. . . ."
134. Indeed, the Chandler Court was not likely to accept explicitly the proposition that
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question open. for experimentation is startling in itself.
A. Television is no longer perceived as possessing
great Due Process Detriment
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of electronic media ac-
cess is that the due process objections put forth in Estes are no
longer valid. The modern electronic media are no longer physically
obtrusive. Small, permanently mounted cameras, without telltale
monitor lights, have been used successfully along with non-obtru-
sive microphone systems.'a Trial participants no longer need no-
tice that the electronic eye is monitoring. In fact, the presence of
newspaper reporters could ultimately be the only visible manifes-
tation of press coverage of a particular trial. "In the years since
Estes, television equipment has improved to the point that cam-
eras are clearly less distracting in court than, say, the exotic ma-
chines employed by stenographic reporters."'," In fact, the elec-
tronic media "can be the least conspicuous of media" involved in
trial coverage. 187
The Chandler Court found that technological change since Estes
was "not unimportant" in its deliberations. 3 8 The Court focused
on the specific safeguards built into Florida's year-long experiment
to determine the effect of cameras in the courtroom, concluding
that such safeguards were sufficient to protect trial participants
from physical disturbance.3 9
increasing the number of viewers in the gallery through electronic coverage will enhance the
defendant's due process rights. Such a position would be contrary to a strong traditional
ideal denouncing "mob law as the very antithesis of due process." Cox v. Louisianna, 379
U.S. 559, 562 (1965); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915). Yet, on the same score,
nowhere in Chandler did the Court suggest that televised coverage would actually enhance
or ensure the fairness of the judicial process-the traditional purpose of press access to the
criminal trial. In sum, although the Court appears to take a middle-of-the-road approach, it
actually departed sharply from precedent.
135. Tauro, A Successful Experiment, 61 JUDICATURE 300 (1978); Monroe, supra note 28,
at 51.
136. Graham, "Yes, Bring Them In," Cameras in the Courtroom: A Dialogue, 64 A.B.A.J.
545, 546 (1978).
137. Monroe, supra note 28. See also In re Post-Newsweek Stations of Florida, Inc., 370
So. 2d 764, 775 (Fla. 1979).
138. 449 U.S. at 576: "Not unimportant to the position asserted by Florida and other
states is the change in television technology since 1962, when Estes was tried. It is urged,
and some empirical data are presented, that many of the negative factors found in Es-
tes-cumbersome equipment, cables, distracting lighting, numerous camera techni-
cians-are less substantial factors today than they were at that time."
139. Id. at 576-77. "It is also significant that safeguards have been built into the experi-
mental programs in state courts, and into the Florida programs, to avoid some of the most
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More difficult is showing that televised trial coverage no longer
presents the psychological intrusion perceived in 1965. Even if
cameras are visible but not physically obtrusive, as Harlan's swing
opinion found to be the case in Estes, it can be argued that they
are so commonplace today that people are not affected by their
presence; that jurors, attorneys, witnesses, judges, and defendants
act no differently in front of the camera. Further, it may be argued
that any prejudicial clamour inevitably arising out of the broadcast
of trials would be lessened if televised trials were not only allowed
but were commonplace.14 0 An interesting and convincing objection
to televised coverage in Estes was that the novelty associated with
the cameras' presence anywhere outside a television studio would
give trial participants an exaggerated sense of the trials' impor-
tance; hence witnesses' testimony and jurors' deliberations would
be prejudiced. However, if cameras were allowed in the courtroom
on a regular basis no heightened sense of importance would be cre-
ated by their presence. It seems that this would be especially true
if cameras were permanently mounted in the courtroom. 1 4
The difficulty in quantifying the psychological effects of the
camera's presence is perhaps shown by the sheer numbers of stud-
egregious problems envisioned by the six opinions in the Estes case."
140. Cf., 381 U.S. at 545. In Estes, the Court noted that the very announcement that a
trial would be televised caused it to become a cause celebre. Proponents of camera access
argue that if rules of court were changed so as to allow cameras free access to the courtroom
this would not be the case; cameras would be present as newspaper reporters are and no
additional prejudice would inhere. In fact, mock cameras permanently mounted in the
courtroom would eliminate the oddity of their presence; trial participants would never know
whether the cameras were activated or not.
141. The case may become a cause celebre because of the totality of press coverage. But
see In re Post-Newsweek Stations of Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 776 (Fla. 1979).
If one accepts the proposition that cameras are commonplace today, even if found outside
of the television studio, it is difficult to explain an experimental program currently under-
way in, of all places, Miami, Florida. Television cameras have been mounted in high crime
areas of Miami in an effort to dissuade criminal offenders. Not all the mountings are real,
however, and it is hoped that this "bluff" of electronic surveillance will cut the locality's
soaring crime rate. T. V. Cameras to Watch the Streets, San Francisco Chronicle, November
16, 1981, §A at 1, col. 3. Applied to the problem of cameras in the courtroom one may ask,
"If mock cameras are left in the courtroom in an effort to make trial participants more
comfortable with them, won't the mere possibility that 'someone' is watching impact on the
conduct of the participants as it would on the conduct of would-be criminals in Miami?" If
the skeptic answers, "No, of course not; the trial participants are not about to commit a
crime," one may probe further and ask, "What if the trial participant thinks that his con-
duct, like criminal conduct, is contrary to social expectations-won't the trial participant
modify his conduct, whatever it may be, to that which he thinks is most acceptable to those
who might be watching?" This line of inquiry is crucial to decide whether the Court in
Chandler made the "right" decision, notwithstanding the view expressed in text accompany-
ing note 169, infra.
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ies done by the judiciary on the subject."" For instance, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court in its decision to allow electronic media cover-
age, Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations of Florida, Inc.,"*4 found
"honest concerns" regarding television's harmful psychological in-
fluence to be "unsubstantiated" by its research.'44 Chandler noted
142. Netteberg, Does Research Support the Estes Ban on Cameras in the Courtroom? 63
JUDICATURE 467 (1980).
143. 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979). It is most interesting that the Florida Supreme Court in
its decision approving television coverage said the Florida judiciary has "proved innovative
in developing new concepts to speed the system and improve the administration of justice."
Id. at 781. The idea of adopting policies that "speed" the administration of justice is closely
aligned with Packer's Crime Control Model.
144. In re Post-Newsweek Stations of Florida, Inc., 370 So.2d 764, 776 (Fla. 1979). In a
survey conducted at the conclusion of a year-long experiment in electronic media coverage
of courtroom proceedings, the court cited several conclusions regarding the presence of cam-
eras in the courtroom:
1) Presence of the electronic media in the courtroom had little effect upon the
respondents' perception of the judiciary or of the dignity of the proceedings. 2) It
was felt that the presence of electronic media disrupted the trial either riot at all
or only slightly. 3) Respondents' awareness of the presence of electronic media
averaged between slightly and moderately. 4) The ability of the attorney and juror
respondents to judge the truthfulness of witnesses was perceived to be affected
not at all. The ability of the jurors to concentrate on the testimony was similarly
unaffected. 5) All respondents were made to feel slightly self-conscious by the
presence of electronic media. 6) Both jurors and witnesses perceived that the pres-
ence of electronic media made them feel just slightly more responsible for their
actions. 7) Presence of electronic media made all respondents feel only slightly
nervous or more attentive. 8) The distracting effect of electronic media was
deemed to range from almost not at all for jurors, to slightly for witnesses and
attorneys. 9) The degree to which jurors and witnesses felt the urge to see or hear
themselves through the media fell between not at all and slightly. 10) Presence of
electronic media affected the different participants' sense of the importance of the
case in varying degrees. Jurors felt that it made the case more important to a
slight degree; witnesses to a degree between slightly and moderately; and attor-
neys moderately. 11) To a degree between not at all and slightly, jurors perceived
that the presence of electronic media in the courtroom during the testimony of a
witness made that witness's testimony more important. 12) There was no signifi-
cant difference in the participants' concern over being harmed as a result of their
appearance on electronic media broadcast (including still photography) as op-
posed to their names appearing in the print media. In each instance the concern
ranged on the scale between not at all and slightly. 13) Jurors and witnesses mani-
fested the same attitude concerning the possibility that persons would attempt to
influence their decision or testimony. There was no discernible difference in the
height of their concern as between electronic and print media; the average re-
sponse was slightly on the lower end of the spectrum between not at all and
slightly. 14) Court personnel and attorneys perceived that the presence of elec-
tronic media made the participating attorneys' actions more flamboyant only to a
slight extent. 15) Court personnel and attorneys were of the attitude that the
presence of electronic media affects the flamboyancy of witnesses to a degree be-
tween not at all and slightly. 16) They also felt that witnesses were slightly inhib-
ited by the presence of electronic media and that jurors were made slightly self-
532 [Vol. 3
ESTES TO CHANDLER
the "sharp debate" over the issue of psychological impact of broad-
cast coverage upon trial participants. 1" The Chandler Court then
dismissed the Estes Court's hypothesis of per se prejudicial psy-
chological impact, saying, "[w]hatever may be the 'mischievous po-
tentialities [of broadcast coverage] for intruding upon the detached
atmosphere which should always surround the judicial process,'
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 587, at present no one has been able to
present empirical data sufficient to establish that the mere pres-
ence of the broadcast media inherently has an adverse effect on
that process." 1 4 6
While it may seem self-evident that, notwithstanding the fact of
technical advancement,1 4 7 the televised medium itself has not
changed in the past sixteen years, Chandler announces that the
Court's perception of the medium and the public's acceptance of
its presence have changed. Following Chandler the trend already
evident will continue; unless evidence is developed to the contrary,
courts will no longer view televised coverage as inherently high in
Due Process Detriment.
C. The Chandler Court.intimates that Crime Con-
trol is a desirable role for the press and is served by
television
Recognition and acceptance of the role televised coverage can
play in attaining Crime Control objectives,"4 promoting esteem for
conscious, nervous, and distracted, but also slightly more attentive.
370 So.2d 764, 768-769. See also Bradly v. Texas, 470 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1972); CBS, Inc. v.
Lieberman, 439 F.Supp. 862 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Gonzales v. People, 165 Colo. 322, 438 P.2d 686
(1968).
145. 449 U.S. at 578: "[I]t is clear that the general issue of psychological impact of broad-
cast coverage upon the participants in a trial, and particularly upon the defendant, is still a
subject of sharp debate. . .
146. 449 U.S. at 578-579.
147. As distinguished from people's impressions and perceptions of the medium.
148. The relationship between socialization and crime control was noted in a series of
newspaper articles on the growing fear of crime among Americans. See San Francisco
Chronicle, October 23, 1980, at 21. An expert was quoted as seeing two alternatives in deal-
ing with crime. The first called for draconian police measures and the second for "more
sophisticated prevention methods, along with a shift in the social fabric to bring about a
recovery of the family and the restoration of the educational system." If the televised press
is the great educator-socializer most media experts believe it to be, see note 41, supra, then
televising the successful workings of the criminal justice system will help control crime. See
Gerbner, supra note 27, at 418: "The process of socialization via entertainment is an exer-
cise in social typing. It sets the norms of society by showing their frequent violations. Of-
fenders and their victims cast for most dramatic attention (or selected as newsworthy) tend
to be those who fit established preconceptions."
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the judicial process and educating the public has become an ac-
ceptable and persuasive argument for cameras in the courtroom.
While Estes dismissed the significance of the argument,"" atti-
tudes in 1982 may demand that more recognition be given to this
role of television.150
Since Estes, there has been a growing awareness of the need for
public confidence in and support of the criminal justice system.15'
Such confidence in the administration of justice comes from an ed-
ucated and enlightened public.'5 2 The Court's departure from Es-
149. 381 U.S. at 532 (Warren, C.J., concurring),
It is argued that television not only entertains but also educates the public. But
the function of a trial is not to provide an educational experience; and there is a
serious danger that any attempt to use a trial as an educational tool will divert it
from its proper purpose and lead to suspicions concerning the integrity of the trial
process. The Soviet Union's trial of Francis Gary Powers provides an example in
point. The integrity of the trial was suspect because it was concerned not only
with determining the guilt of the individual on trial but also with providing an
object lesson to the public. This divided effort undercut confidence in the guilt-
determining aspect of the procedure and by so doing rendered the educational
aspect self-defeating.
150. See Warren Burger's Message to the ABA: Striking a Fair Balance, Los Angeles
Daily Journal, February 12, 1981, at 4, col. 4. As a general proposition, attitudes within the
public may have swung just far enough toward a high valuation of the Crime Control Value
and toward deemphasis of television's Due Process Detriment to allow cameras access to the
courtroom. See, e.g., COMMIrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REDUCING CRIME AND AssUR-
ING JUSTICE 9 (1972). This group of distinguished businessmen published a report in 1972
indicating that "Prompt, equitable, and -effective administration of justice is the first re-
sponsibility of a civilized society." It went on to recommend that a "Federal Authority to
Ensure Justice" be established by the government to correct the "defective" management of
criminal justice institutions. The sentiment of the American public may be seen in the 1981
Gallup Poll which found respondents blaming "the economic situation, permissiveness in
society and an inadequate judiciary system" as the causes of increased crime. "[A] large
majority of Americans believe the nation's legal system should come down much harder on
criminals . . . ." G. Gallup, "Deep U.S. Fear of Crime Found By Gallup Poll," San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, April 6, 1981, at 6, col. 1.
151. See Loewen, supra note 28, at 511. See also Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) where Justice Brennan concluded in his-concurring opinion that
press coverage of trials "contribute[s] to public understanding of the rule of law and to
comprehension of the functioning of the entire justice system . . . ."
152. Although it did not directly address the question, the Court in Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980), seemed to acknowledge the educational
value of public attendance at criminal trials through the elctronic medium.
In earlier times, both in England and America, attendance at court was a common
mode of 'passing the time'. [citations omitted] With the press, cinema, and elec-
tronic media now supplying the representation or reality of the real life drama
once available only in the courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a wide-
spread pastime. Yet '[ilt is not unrealistic even in this day to believe that public
inclusion affords citizens a form of legal education and hopefully promotes confi-
dence in the fair administration of justice.' State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 139
N.W.2d 800, 807 (1966). Instead of acquiring information about trials by first
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tes in Chandler suggests there is no better way to inform the pub-
lic than by allowing court viewing on television. As a result, more
potential criminals may be deterred from committing crime upon
seeing "justice done" in the courts.
The Supreme Court's recent Richmond Newspapers decision
recognized the importance of society's criminal trial processes "do-
ing justice" by satisfying the "appearance of justice."153 Thus, the
Court seemed to clearly embrace Crime Control tenets in the
course of finding that closed trial proceedings are permissible only
under the most extraordinary circumstances. The Court's dicta are
revealing:
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigi-
lante the enforcement of criminal law, but they cannot erase from
people's consciousness the fundamental, natural yearning to see
justice done-or even the urge for retribution. The crucial pro-
phylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function
in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is 'done
in a corner [or] in any covert manner.' [Citations omitted] It is
not enough to say that results alone will satiate the natural com-
munity desire for 'satisfaction'. A result considered untoward may
undermine public confidence, and where the trial has been con-
cealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reac-
tion that the system at best has failed and at worst has been cor-
rupted. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal
process 'satisfy the appearance of justice,' [Citations omitted] and
the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people
to observe it.15"
Chandler does not specifically address the Crime Control objec-
tives to be served by televised coverage. Yet by clearly rejecting,
subject to contrary results of state experimentation, the idea that
televised coverage constituted punishment before trial or that tele-
vised coverage had harmful effects on the factfinding process,155
hand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now ac-
quire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates
the media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public.
153. Id. at 572.
154. Id. at 571-572.
155. In addressing these issues the Court said:
Selection of which trials, or parts of trials, to broadcast will inevitably be made
not by judges but by the media, and will be governed by such factors as the nature
of the crime and the status and position of the accused-or of the victim; the
effect may be to titillate rather than to educate and inform. The unanswered
question is whether electronic coverage will bring public humiliation upon the ac-
cused with such randomness that it will evoke due process concerns by being 'un-
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Justice Burger made the way clear for allowing televised coverage
with its strong Crime Control element into the courtroom. 5 6
Although the Estes Court did not conclude that working for in-
creased public knowledge of the judiciary was undesirable, it indi-
cated in strong dicta that such was not "the function of a trial."M5 7
In the "early days" of television, the Court did not include televi-
sion's Crime Control Values in its balancing of the rights of the
press and the accused, perhaps because it did not conceive of such
a quality existing. Not until Estes had there been serious discus-
sion of the potential benefits of broadcast coverage"8-and there it
was summarily dismissed. As a result, the hypothesized psychologi-
cal impact and the then-obvious physical obtrusiveness of elec-
tronic medium coverage overshadowed Estes' assessment of Crime
Control possibilities. The existence of that situation made Chan-
dler therefore appear even more to be a striking departure from
Estes.
Chandler's acceptance of cameras in the courtroom represents a
usual in the same way that being struck by lightning' is 'unusual.' [citations omit-
ted] Societies and political systems that, from time to time, have put on "Yankee
Stadium' 'show trials' tell more about the power of the state than about its con-
cern for the decent administration of justice-with every citizen receiving the
same kind of justice.
The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Warren joined by Justices Douglas and
Goldberg in Estes can fairly be read as viewing the very broadcast of some trials
. . . as punishment before guilt. This concern is far from trivial. But, whether
coverage of a few trials will, in practice, be the equivalent of a 'Yankee Stadium'
setting-which Justice Harlan likened to the public pillory long abandoned as a
barbaric perversion of decent justice-must also await the continuing experimen-
tation." 449 U.S. at 580-581.
156. Other evidence lends support to this view. In an address to the American Bar Associ-
ation delivered just two weeks after Chandler was announced, Chief Justice Burger called
for a "War on Crime," utilizing the "deterrent effect of swift and certain consequences: swift
arrest, prompt trial, certain penalty . . . ." Justice Burger explained that part of today's
crime problem "stems from the fact that we have virtually eliminated from public schools
and higher education any effort to teach values of integrity, truth, personal accountability,
respect for others' rights." "Warren Burger's Message to the ABA: Striking a Fair Bal-
ance," Los Angeles Daily Journal, February 12, 1981, at 6, col. 5. Would not the showing on
television of swift and sure adjudicatory functioning help teach those values and deter
crime? Burger's comments are an invaluable clue to understanding his opinion for the Court
in Chandler. See Blind Justice Gets a Seeing Eye, Time, Feb. 9, 1981, at 51, "The decision
[Chandler] seemed to be at odds with the court's 'anti-press' image. Its author, Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger, is known to dislike television." Burger reiterated his view in his address
to the 1981 graduating class of the George Washington University Law School on Sunday,
May 25, 1981.
157. 381 U.S. at 575 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
158. See 381 U.S. at 570.
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greater understanding of all the medium's possible impact.16 9 The
Crime Control functions of the modern press, including television,
may be more expansively assessed in determining questions of me-
dia access to the courtroom. Since the 1981 Court seeks to' con-
form, more closely than the Court in Estes, to the values repre-
sented in Packer's Crime Control Model, 6 0 it is easier for the
Court to accept this function of the modern American press.
VI. Additional Considerations
It is one thing to explain the Court's outcome in. Chandler; it is
quite another fully to endorse it. One can only wonder what un-
foreseen problems will arise from the Chandler decision. The Chi-
nese broadcast coverage of the trial of the Gang of Four"' and the
suggestion that executions in the United States be televised 1 2 are
eerie premonitions of the possibly abusive utilization of the elec-
tronic medium to "satisfy the appearance of justice" and deter
crime.
A more plausible difficulty inherent in the Court's underlying
and unstated premise regarding the Crime Control power of televi-
sion is that televised coverage may have a Crime Control influence
only if viewers' expectations of the criminal justice system are met
by what they see."' In other words, if what the public views is
perceived to be just, public confidence in the judiciary will be en-
hanced and law and order promoted. Such seemed to be the case of
159. In the future perhaps it will be said that Chandler reflects our limited understanding
of the electronic medium. The writer does not intend to advocate the use of cameras in the
courtroom. Rather, it is hoped that the discussion here will make those involved in decision
making cognizant of the "special" attributes of the electronic press. If the judiciary is, to
any extent, about to enter George Orwell's "1984", it should do so with very open eyes.
160. See notes 119 and 120, supra.
161. See Gang of 4 Trial Is Chinese T. V.'s Biggest Show, San Francisco Chronicle, Nov-
ember 24, 1980, at 17, col. 1.
162. Getlein, "Speculative Spectaculars", COMMONWEAL, Jan. 7, 1977, at 4.
163. The Court in Richmond Newspapers touched on such a possibility when discussing
the pursuit of apparent justice, noting "[a] [judicial] result considered untoward [by the
community] may undermine public confidence [in the judiciary] . . . ." 448 U.S. 555, 571.
McLuhan, supra note 96, at 312, made an interesting reference to the interplay between the
electronic medium and the courts: "Raymond Burr, who plays Perry Mason, spoke to the
National Association of Municipal Judges, reminding them that, 'Without our laymen's un-
derstanding and acceptance, the laws which you apply and the courts in which you preside
cannot continue to exist.' What Mr. Burr failed to observe was that the Perry Mason T.V.
program in which he plays the lead is typical of that intensely participational kind of T.V.
experience that has altered our relation to the laws and the courts." What Mr. McLuhan
omitted to observe was the idea suggested in the text: What happens if the public's expecta-
tions are not met by what it sees through this "intensely participational" medium?
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the televised inquest into the death of Los Angeles Times reporter
Reuben Salazar: the coverage was widely credited with helping
avoid rioting in the minority community of Los Angeles.1 " How-
ever, if the viewing public perceives an unjust result, public opin-
ion of the criminal justice system will be lowered. Such was the
situation with the 1980 McDuffie case in Miami."' Viewing the de-
fendants' relieved acceptance of the "not guilty" verdict popularly
believed to be unjust, arguably helped touch off serious rioting in
Miami's minority community."
As evidence is collected it may be shown that the Crime Control
Value of the electronic media might, as with Due Process Values,
be both positively and negatively served.16 7 If this is the case, tele-
vised trial proceedings may promote not only a judiciary more re-
sponsive to the public, and a public more understanding of the
success of our criminal justice system, but also a public more aware
of the limits of the system. Proponents of cameras in the court-
room argue that the possibility that members of the viewing public
may see the results of courtroom proceedings as unjust should have
164. FRETZ, COURTS AND THE NEWS MEDIA 104 (1977).
165. The McDuffie case arose from the beating death of a black insurance executive by
four white Miami police officers after a high speed motorcycle chase through Miami streets.
The police officers were acquitted of all charges by a Tampa jury after the case was moved
from Miami to assure the accuseds' right to a fair trial. The verdict touched off civil disor-
der and rioting, resulting in sixteen people killed, 436 people injured, and 1267 persons ar-
rested. Infra note 166. It is widely believed that the McDuffie verdict resulted from the
prosecution's inability to meet the burden of proof necessary to prove the charges. While
the defendants were popularly believed to be factually guilty, the result was a finding of not
guilty. Salzman Changes Mind About 'Red-Neck' Decision, Miami News, August 27, 1980,
sec. B, at 5; McDuffie Verdict Was 'Justice', Tallahassee Democrat, June 9, 1980, sec. A at
4. See also "CBS Reports: Miami: The Trial That Sparked The Riots" aired 10-11 p.m.
EST, August 27, 1980 over thq CBS television network.
166. See, e.g., Weingarren, Riot puts TV court coverage on trial, National Law Journal,
June 2, 1980, at 10. It was argued in Chandler that "[w]hile the riots were largely a result of
economic and housing disparity in Miami's Black Community, the one event which 'lit the
fuse' was the drama of seeing, on television, the acquittal of" the policemen. See Brief of
Appellants at 51, n. 28, Reply Brief of Appellants at 18-19, Chandler v. Florida, No. 79-1260
(U.S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term 1979). See Also, "Does Television make a fair trial impossi-
ble?-a debate", 64 JUDICATURE 145 (1980).
167. American Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on Televising and
Broadcasting Legislative and Judicial Proceedings, 77 A.B.A. REP. 607, 610 (1952), recog-
nized this possibility, saying: "The educational effect of a televised or broadcast trial on the
general public can be but negligible; it may even be detrimental. The experience thus far
with radio broadcasting and motion pictures of trials has shown that only the most sordid
crimes are likely to be televised. In addition, the undue publicity from the telecasting of
criminal trials may pander to the desire of abnormal criminal minds for mock heroics and
resulting fame. To sensationalize such trials by television can have but an injurious effect on
public morals."
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no force in deciding whether cameras are allowed into trial.16' "It is
argued that the Constitution does not make the court arbiters of
the image that a televised state criminal trial projects to the pub-
lic;" the courts' only concern should be whether the defendant's
right to due process was infringed. The problem is that once cam-
eras are given access to the courtroom the courts may not have any
power to control the image that a televised trial conveys, short of
altering the image altogether to serve the viewers.'" Given these
unsettled questions, especially if television's influence is as great as
many believe, the Crime Control Values served should be the
source of continuing research in the future.1 0
VII. Conclusion
Estes and Chandler are more convincingly explained in terms of
the broad societal interests regarding those due process rights and
crime control interests which are served by televised coverage of
criminal proceedings rather than by a traditional free-press/fair-
trial analysis which does not consider crime control interest.'7 1
Recognizing that the modern press' power extends far beyond se-
curing the rights of the accused, and that the different media pos-
sess these powers to different degrees, help better to explain Estes
and Chandler and to predict the outcomes in the camera-in-the-
courtroom cases to come. Since the Court has not clearly and ex-
168. See Will, "The Not-So-Mighty Tube," NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1977, at 84 for argument
that public opinions are not so easily swayed by television. "To represent television journal-
ism as a fundamentally transforming force is to make the nation's politics seem less pur-
poseful, more mindless, more a matter of random causes than is the case. The contours of
history are not determined by communications technology, however much it pleases people
to think that history is what, and only what, can be seen at home." This editorial view
seems to have been validly contradicted by survey data. See note 95, supra.
169. See generally Gerbner, supra note 27.
170. California's experimental research on the impact of televised criminal proceedings
will evaluate 1) the impact of coverage on the behavior of trial participants and 2) the level
of distraction caused by camera's presence. Judicial Council of California, Request for Pro-
posals for Experimentation and Evaluation of Extended Media Coverage in the
Courts- Year One, Dec. 19, 1979. However, a minority of the Chief Justice's Special Com-
mittee on the Courts and the Media supported "a wider evaluation encompassing all as-
serted benefits and costs of extended coverage." Id. at Appendix A, n. 7. The wider scope of
evaluation would have included the educative impact of broadcasting. Id. at Appendix B.
171. "The conflict [arising from the traditional fair trial/free press analysis] should not be
seen as between defendant's right and press freedoms, but rather as between the govern-
ment's interest in convicting criminals and the public's right of access. Such a view helps to
circumvent the impasse created by the traditional formulation . . . ." Note, Trial Secrecy
and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1899, 1924 (1978). See also United States v. Ciafrani, 573 F.2d 835, 852 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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plicitly discussed these interests,"7 the task must be undertaken
by legal commentators and mass media scholars.
As for future judicial action in this area, the "sharp debate" con-
tinues over the camera's psychological impact on trial participants.
The Supreme Court has not claimed that there is clear and con-
vincing evidence showing a minimal risk of prejudicial impact; it
has merely placed the burden of proof on the appellant to show
prejudice. An observer can only wonder whether these nine men
can really be sure about the degree of prejudicial impact caused by
television coverage.1 78
The Court in Chandler grappled with difficult questions. How-
ever, this writer believes that the Court's current First Amendment
approach to these questions is antiquated 17'-at least when it
comes to explaining the different impact of the modern press on
jurors and trial participants. The types of issues presented in Estes
and Chandler17 5 may later help the Court realize the inadequacy of
traditional print press oriented First Amendment analysis in this
electronic age. Chandler especially may help the Court jump the
gap from the Gutenberg Age to the Electronic Age-for better or
for worse.
172. Even assuming that it recognized them, the Court would be hard pressed to discuss
these interests insofar as it would mark a revolutionary change in First Amendment analy-
sis, e.g. "medium relative" First Amendment rights.
173. In discussing its impact on society, McLuhan described television as the "timid gi-
ant" of mass media. The writer agrees on this score and wonders if the Justices approached
the issues in Chandler with the same attitude. That is, that there may be more to the im-
pact of television than that which is scientifically ascertainable or readily observable.
McLuhan, supra note 96, at 308.
Since Chandler seventeen states have acted to expand camera coverage: Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Four states have
moved against expanded coverage: Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, and New York.
Abrahams, New efforts in 17 states to expand camera coverage of courts, 65 JUDICATURE
116 (1981).
174. See text following that accompanying note 28, supra. Also see note 173 supra.
175. In fact, Chandler's failure to overturn Estes may lead to the development of "me-
dium relative" First Amendment rights: some future appellant's suggestion of non-quantifi-
able psychological prejudice plus some exposure of juror prejudice through voir dire may
suffice to overturn a conviction in a televised trial, where a clear showing of prejudice ex-
posed through voir dire will be required in non-televised trials. See Haimbaugh, Free Press
Versus Fair Trial: The Contribution of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 26 U. PIrT. L. REV. 491,
515 (1965): "It may be that in recognition of the stunning impact of television, the Court [in
cases involving television coverage] is setting up 'trial by television' as a variant of 'trial by
newspaper' with regard to which it will require less demonstration of effect on the commu-
nity [to overturn a trial conviction]." Haimbaugh wrote prior to the Estes decision.
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What Marshall McLuhan said about the impact of the electronic
medium upon a society inculcated with the print media may well
be asked about the impact of the electronic medium upon our judi-
cial institutions:
What will be the new configurations of mechanisms and of liter-
acy as these older forms of perception and judgment are interpen-
etrated by the new electric age? The new electric galaxy of events
has already moved deeply into the Gutenberg galaxy. Even with-
out collision, such coexistence of technologies and awareness
brings trauma and tension to every living person. Our most ordi-
nary and conventional attitudes seem suddenly twisted into gar-
goyles and grotesques. Familiar institutions and associations seem
at times menacing and malignant. These mulitiple transforma-
tions, which are the normal consequence of introducing new me-
dia into any society whatever, need special study. . . .7e
176. M. McLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY 278-279 (1962).
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